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ABSTRACT 
 
The “shortage of migrant workers” phenomenon is not only a reflection of the changing concept 
of occupation for Chinese migrant workers, but it also increases job opportunities for such 
workers. Migrant workers fight for higher wages through strikes and collective negotiations. 
These changes reflect the enhancement of the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers. 
 
This paper explores the factors that enhance Chinese migrant workers bargaining power, uses a 
fuzzy comprehensive evaluation based on the analytic hierarchy process to assess the effect of 
various factors, and analyzes the positive and negative effects of enhancing the bargaining power. 
Finally, this paper predicts changes in the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers and 
provides corresponding recommendations to protect their advantages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he implementation of reforms and the process of opening up in China started the rapid 
industrialization and urbanization in the country. Thus, a large number of farmers came into the city 
as workers and formed a huge special group known as migrant workers. Chinese migrant workers 
have been promoting the development of various sectors of the national economy and have made important 
contributions to the modernization of China. The country has more than 200 million migrant workers, and this 
number continues to rise. Therefore, migrant workers are gaining a collective personality and have become the main 
components of industrial workers in China (Ping, Mujtaba, Whetten, & Wei, 2012). Both the “migrant worker tide” 
in the 1980s and the “labor shortage” in recent years have demonstrated the impact of migrant workers on the 
Chinese labor market. This shift resulted from the demand of migrant workers for a change in their wages. Income 
problems of migrant workers have caught the attention of government departments and the academe because the 
income of the former is not synchronized with the economic development of China. The low income of migrant 
workers, irrational revenue structure, unfair social distribution, and lack of share in the benefits of the Chinese 
economic development made the income of migrant workers an important constraint factor in the industrialization, 
urbanization, and coordinated development of urban and rural processes in the country. 
 
In recent years, the government and the community have attached great importance to the wage problem of 
migrant workers, with wages eventually improving to some extent. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the 
Chinese urban labor market emerged as a clear intergenerational replacement, with migrant workers born in the 
1950s and 1960s gradually moving out of the urban labor market and the new generation of migrant workers born 
after the 1980s gradually becoming the main component of the urban labor market. The new generation of migrant 
workers from rural areas who were born in the 1980s and whose ages are between 16 and 28 years old started 
working or conducting business in cities in the late 1990s or the early 2000s. Most of them entered the city as 
workers after graduation, having a higher level of education, no farming experience, mostly unmarried, being lifted 
T 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2014 Volume 30, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 136 The Clute Institute 
out of the social life in rural areas, and having close ties to city life (Zhou & Wan, 2009). Their upbringing, life 
experiences, values, and future expectations are different from those of their parents, as older-generation migrant 
workers live by their thrifty and industrious characteristics, can survive in factories, and consider the rural areas their 
last destination. However, the new-generation migrant workers, who are the consumer type and enjoy city life, do 
not passively accept lower wages and have higher expectations on their employment environment and wages. 
 
CHANGES IN THE BARGAINING POWER OF MIGRANT WORKERS 
 
Wage negotiation is a process in which two sides, under conditions of asymmetric information, bargain 
with each other according to their respective expectations. With the current system of wage bargaining model in 
China based on the bargaining theory, workers have not bargained for wages and employment conditions with 
enterprises directly, but they can make their own choices whether to accept the wages that enterprises offer (Lu, 
2004). Thus, firms have to account the behavior of employees during wage and employment optimal decisions. 
Existing studies on the bargaining power of employees and workers represent their bargaining power with the 
general level of wages or income (Svejnar, 1986). At the same time, the more job opportunities and the 
improvement of employment autonomy demonstrate the enhancement of the bargaining power of employees. 
 
The bargaining power of the new generation of migrant workers has clearly improved compared with the 
older-generation migrant workers. The improvement of the bargaining power of migrant workers is demonstrated 
mainly in two aspects. 
 
First, migrant workers have more job options and their employment autonomy is consequently enhanced. 
The “labor shortage” phenomenon occurred in the local coastal areas of China in 2003. After eight or nine years, the 
previous “local labor shortage” developed into the “overall labor shortage.” Research by the Human Resources and 
Social Security of Guangdong Province indicates that enterprises in Guangdong lacked one million workers in 2012 
(Wang, 2012). The relatively large employment gap in Shunde District has enabled job seekers to choose from three 
to four jobs available. Different degrees of “recruitment difficulties” also emerged in the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze 
River Delta, the Bohai Sea, and other important economic regions in China as well as in large migrant workers-
exporting provinces. The employment of migrant workers shifted from “workers find factory” to “factory find 
workers.” As the main labor force, migrant workers can improve their income fast, which is a major boost in 
changing the irrational revenue structure. From this perspective, the “labor shortage” phenomenon of migrant 
workers increases more job opportunities for migrant workers and enhances their bargaining power with employers, 
as migrant workers have more options and their job autonomy has been more enhanced. 
 
Second, the wages and income of migrant workers have increased. In May 2010, a number of workers in 
the Foxconn, a Taiwanese factory located in Shenzhen, committed suicide (Foxconn is the largest exporter in China, 
with more than 270,000 employees in Shenzhen alone). The workers who committed suicide were migrant workers 
and production workers in labor-intensive enterprises. The company subsequently announced that it would double 
the wages after a three-month trial period. In June, Honda suppliers held a series of strikes. Although the number of 
striking workers of the Honda Group did not reach 2000 and most of the strikes did not last more than one week, the 
workers were able to succeed in their endeavor, as their working condition was improved and their salaries were 
increased. In the Honda Lock Factory in Guangdong, workers demanded a wage increase of 70 percent but were 
given an increase of 28 percent instead (Oxford Economic Report, 2010). These strikes resulted in employees 
receiving substantial increase in wages, as the solution to the strikes in general was a wage increase of 20 percent to 
25 percent. In 2011, data from the Employment Management Services Bureau in Yiwu City indicate that the 
pressure of “labor shortage” has caused the basic wages of ordinary workers in factories to reach 1500 yuan to 1800 
yuan. In several enterprises, the security wage of ordinary workers even reached more than 2 000 yuan (Zhang, 
2011). On January 1, 2013, a total of 24 provinces in China increased the minimum wage standards, with Shenzhen 
providing the highest monthly minimum wage (1 500) followed by Zhejiang (1 470) and Shanghai (1 450). Beijing 
has the highest minimum hourly wage standard (15.2), followed by Xinjiang (13.4) and Shenzhen (13.3) (sina news, 
2012). 
 
The improving awareness on the collective negotiations of migrant workers and the growth of labor union 
power influence the bargaining power of the workers. Low wages triggered strong dissatisfaction among migrant 
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workers, causing labor relations to become tense. In November 2009, the labor unions in Xianduan Jingmi (a 
Chinese corporate) issued a collective negotiation offer to the employer side, particularly bargaining on wage 
increase. The two sides agreed in 2010, with frontline employees receiving a wage increase of 10 percent and non-
frontline staff receiving a wage increase of 8 percent. The Yantian labor union took a similar action. For 10 years, 
three growth curves impressed the people of Yantian: the throughput of the port is a rising curve, the corporate profit 
is a rising curve, but the wages of workers is a horizontal line. The efforts of the union resulted in the enterprise 
finally agreeing to increase the wages of workers. 
 
Overall, the “labor shortage,” strikes, and collective union negotiations improved the wages of migrant 
workers and enhanced autonomous employment. The salary increase tide has subtly enhanced the bargaining power 
of migrant workers. However, the bargaining power of migrant workers was restricted in several periods and 
regions. For example, employment growth quickly rebounded and increased from 0.7 percent in the first quarter of 
2009 to 3.8 percent in the first quarter of 2010. In the past few quarters, nominal wage growth had been hovering at 
approximately 13 percent. The acceleration of the Chinese Consumer Price Index during the same period caused real 
wage growth to fall to 10.6 percent in the first quarter of 2010 from 14.2 percent in the third quarter of 2009. This 
phenomenon may be related to price fluctuations or short-term fluctuations in the economy. In general, the wages of 
migrant workers and their bargaining power have improved. Therefore, this paper focuses on the enhancement of the 
bargaining power of the migrant workers. 
 
FACTORS ENHANCING THE BARGAINING POWER OF MIGRANT WORKERS 
 
This paper analyzed 24 English papers, eight Chinese papers, and 13 news stories and reports and extracted 
a number of factors that enhance the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers. The materials indicate that only 
a few local studies exist on the bargaining power of migrant workers or ordinary domestic laborers, whereas other 
countries have more studies on the same subject but are based more on foreign social context and focused more on 
urban workers. Chinese migrant workers have different characteristics and experience from foreign workers, and the 
change in bargaining power and influencing factors of the former are also different from workers in other countries. 
 
The authors of this study also conducted personal interviews with 10 migrant workers, 10 employers, 10 
union officials, and 10 government staff members. Results of the interview were included in the discussion of the 
factors that enhance the bargaining power of migrant workers. In this study, using a semi-structured interview 
method, which is unlike the structured approach that is restricted by the interviewer's answer and prevents 
unstructured data statistics, the interviews focused on the following issues: (a) Understand relevant background and 
demographic information about the interviewees; (b) Understand the view of interviewees on the concept of 
bargaining power; (c) Understand what the interviewees consider as the factors that enhance the bargaining power of 
migrant workers; (d) Require the interviewees to determine which among the factors they shared are more 
important; (e) Understand what the interviewees consider the enhancement of the bargaining power of migrant 
workers. 
 
Migrant Workers 
 
Quality and Human Capital Improvement of Migrant Workers 
 
The quality of heterogeneity of laborers results in incomplete competition in the labor market; the higher 
the quality of workers, the higher is the corresponding wage (MacLeod & Maleomson, 1993). The study also 
indicates that when the quality of workers is controlled, wage differentials and the wage premium phenomenon will 
disappear (Yankow, 2006). Differences in the human capital of workers are mainly decided by innate endowment 
and their education level (Xue, 2008). A survey conducted by the Guangzhou Human Resource Market Service 
Center indicates that qualifications and skills of the new generation of migrant workers have improved to a certain 
extent; their job choices are relatively broader so that most of them are not interested in general work; and hands-
class posts, jobs, and treatment provided by the traditional manufacturing industry have been unable to attract them. 
Relevant empirical research indicates that the higher the educational and skill level of workers, the higher is the 
level of their wages. Table 1 presents a comparison the between two generations of migrant workers in the eastern 
region in China. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Educational Level between Two Generations 
Educational Level Primary and Lower Junior High School High School and Above 
Old Generation 36.76% 43.4% 19.84% 
New Generation 7.44% 51.06% 41.5% 
 
Enhancement of Group Influences of Migrant Workers 
 
With the continuous development of the economy and urbanization in China, migrant workers play a more 
important role in the economic construction and the development of urbanization in the country. The current share 
of the tertiary industry in China, especially the service sector in the economic and industrial structures, is growing 
and the demand for labor is increasing. The tertiary industry, and not just the traditional manufacturing and 
construction industries, needs a large number of migrant workers, especially the service sector. The economic 
development in China cannot be disassociated from the hard work of migrant workers. The effects and roles of 
Chinese migrant workers are currently more prominent. Therefore, the issue of migrant workers has attracted the 
attention of enterprises, government, and social institutions. From a theoretical point of view, this kind of influence 
of Chinese migrant workers groups is derived from their mass production and creativity. Moreover, the reason why 
Chinese migrant workers play an important role in the economic development of China is that such groups in the 
labor process or human capital formation process can produce a collaborative power, which is not a simple sum of 
individual collaborative forces but a multiplier effect (Leap & Grigsby, 1986). 
 
Increasing the Awareness on Collective Bargaining 
 
Chinese migrant workers exhibit a remarkable characteristic when looking for a job: collective behavior. 
The reason for this behavior is that migrant workers are homogeneous; people from the same village have close 
links to each other (Zhou & Zhang, 2005). Migrant workers generally seek jobs in cities by asking help from fellow 
townsmen and relatives, and find work in droves. Chinese migrant workers from the same village usually work in 
the same factory, which is a very common phenomenon in China. One migrant worker not only can bring a group of 
migrant workers to work there but also take away a group. Chinese migrant workers actually conduct collective 
bargaining with enterprises, either accepting the wage of employers or exiting collectively. In the current era of 
“shortage of migrant workers,” this kind of collective bargaining behavior of migrant workers is powerful. 
Moreover, the awareness on collective bargaining of Chinese migrant workers is increasing so enterprises are 
concerned about their collective exit. In this context, the collective bargaining power of migrant workers has 
improved significantly. 
 
Information Superiority of Migrant Workers 
 
The information superiority mentioned in this paper refers to the understanding or being familiar with a 
variety of related information such as businesses, jobs, and policies, among others (Svejnar, 1986). More 
information at one’s disposal strengthens bargaining power. The Chinese government is particularly concerned 
about the issue of migrant workers and takes several policies and measures to focus its efforts on resolving the issue 
of migrant workers. Chinese migrant workers pay attention to relevant national policies and institutions, such as the 
Chinese governmental regulation of minimum wage standard and the prohibition of wage arrears of migrant 
workers. Using these regulations and policies as weapons, Chinese migrant workers have legal basis to protect their 
legitimate rights and interests in negotiations with enterprises. The improvement of cultural and educational levels 
has equipped migrant workers with a certain understanding of business and financial knowledge. The government 
requires listed companies to make public operational and financial information so that migrant workers can infer 
their acceptable wage level. Migrant workers who have a better understanding of the information on wage 
bargaining with enterprises have the ability to fight for higher wages. 
 
Enterprises 
 
Type of Business (Dependence on Migrant Workers) 
 
The dependency on migrant workers of different enterprise is not the same (Zhong, 2003). The core 
competitiveness of several enterprises mainly depends on capital; a number depend on technologies, whereas others 
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depend on labor. For labor-intensive enterprises, labor is the most important productive factor, and the absence of a 
large number of workers directly affects the production. The current development of the secondary industry in 
China, with the development of the manufacturing sector, is still going strong, as the demand for ordinary labor 
remain exuberant. Migrant workers form the main body of ordinary labor. As such, they are in an advantageous 
position to negotiate with employers, especially in the production and manufacturing industries, because of the 
dependency of the latter on the former. 
 
Loss Cost of Migrant Workers 
 
The loss of migrant workers in China has a significant characteristic called collective loss or collective 
resignation. The employer’s ability to afford business risk is a dominant aspect; it has strong negotiating power in 
the bargaining between employers and employees (Shi, 1995). If enterprises that demand more migrant workers are 
able to assume collective losses (i.e., recruitment, training, and technical losses) and the potential production 
stoppage caused by migrant workers loss, then such enterprises have higher bargaining power than the migrant 
workers. If companies cannot shoulder the losses, then these companies have a weak position when negotiating with 
migrant workers. 
 
Development Stage of Enterprises 
 
The bargaining power of migrant workers in the different development stages of the enterprise is different 
(Sheng & Yu, 2003). China is still a developing country, and a gap still exists at the economic level between it and 
the other advanced countries in the world. The economic structure of China is not perfect, as the proportion of the 
tertiary industry is still not high and the economy relies more on the development of the secondary industry. After 
three decades of development since the reform and opening up has entered a mature stage, the secondary industry, 
especially the manufacturing sector, tends to retain mature migrant workers labor. Therefore, enterprises are 
considered the weak side when negotiating with migrant workers. In the tertiary industry, especially the service 
sector that started relatively late and most businesses that are still in their formative years, the role of the labor force 
is increasing, providing several advantages for migrant workers over the employers. 
 
External Environment 
 
Supply and Demand in the Labor Market (Competitive Conditions) 
 
The wage bargaining power of migrant workers is determined by the supply and demand of the labor 
market (Pacitti, 2009). The level of bargaining power depends on the scarcity of input factors. Extreme scarcity and 
the non-substituting factor certainly bring powerful negotiating force to the owner. However, if a certain resource 
has adequate supply, then the owners cannot increase their power in the negotiating process. The current nationwide 
“shortage of migrant workers” in China not only takes place in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta, and 
the Beijing-Tianjin region but also in several central and western regions in the country. The supply of Chinese 
migrant workers is less than the demand and supply of mature migrant workers with technology-related skills. 
Experience is especially in shortage. Moreover, the situation of short supply of Chinese migrant workers brings 
about a relatively strong bargaining power for migrant workers. 
 
Local Industrial Concentration 
 
If industries are relatively concentrated in certain places only, then hundreds or even thousands of the same 
types of enterprises as well as the same types of employees (e.g., engineers and technicians) will exist, which is 
conducive in enhancing the negotiating power of employers (Bental & Demougin, 2010). For example, the tie 
production enterprises in Shengzhou of Zhejiang Province number in the thousands, with the number of workers 
reaching more than 30 000. If an employee leaves the enterprise, the supervisor will find it easy to look for a 
replacement. In other regions where only a limited number of tie factories are present, expect that employees in this 
factory, even if they have limited skills, will be treated very well by the supervisor because of the limited supply of 
employees in the vicinity. In this case, employees have strong bargaining power. 
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Role of Labor Unions 
 
According to the collective wage bargaining theory, the presence of labor unions has enabled wages to be 
mainly decided through collective bargaining agreements between the labor unions, which represent workers, and 
the employers (Dutt & Sen, 1997). In the face of the long-time dominance of business owners, the power of Chinese 
migrant workers dispersed. They do not have the requirements for wage bargaining and lack the channels to protect 
their rights. Well-organized labor unions can help Chinese migrant workers to bargain for higher wages, especially 
when they have a certain amount of leverage, such as the threat of strikes. Union membership has a significant role 
in the wages of migrant workers, and it helps bring about more than 10 percent of the wage premium (Chen & Chen, 
2011). Chinese migrant workers spontaneously organize to unite or join a union through legal means to improve 
self-organization. Collective bargaining can effectively curb the irrational competition between migrant workers and 
enhance their right to speak in wage negotiations, while improving the bargaining power of migrant workers. 
 
Government and Policy Support 
 
As labor unions have limitations, the wages of workers largely depend on the government and relevant 
departments for increase. According to Zeng Fanqiang, chairman of the general labor union of Guangzhou, 
experience of many years with great successes show that the local government and other relevant units are greatly 
important, the migrant workers’ problems are generally handled well, and the rights and interests of migrant workers 
are maintained at a good level (Xinhua News, 2011). The minimum wage standard of the government covers 
vulnerable groups such as migrant workers. The Guangdong Provincial Federation of Labor Unions has vigorously 
promoted industry–regional collective contract systems in recent years. Many companies have signed a collective 
contract. Relevant laws, regulations, and institutional policies provide protection to migrant workers regarding their 
wages as well as provide a legal system base for the bargaining power of migrant workers in terms of wages and 
employment. 
 
FUZZY EVALUATION APPROACH OF THE BARGAINING POWER 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the factors that enhance the bargaining power of migrant workers. 
However, a question remains: Do these factors have the same effects? How is the total bargaining power of migrant 
workers? Therefore, the effects of each factor need further analysis. The evaluation of the bargaining power of 
migrant workers is the result of the vague subjective consciousness of the people, and the analysis of factors that 
enhance the bargaining power of migrant workers is even more unclear. The vagueness of these factors has 
prevented us from conducting an evaluation using simple scores. Zadeh (1965) first introduced the fuzzy set theory 
which was oriented to the rationality of uncertainty due to imprecision or vagueness. The AHP was developed in the 
1970s by Saaty. The analytic hierarchy process method combines qualitative and quantitative analyses effectively, 
keeping the model systematic and rational as well as enabling decision makers to fully utilize their experience and 
judgment for mathematical decision making. Therefore, this paper proposes to expand the AHP processes to a fuzzy 
environment and build a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model based on it. 
 
Building a Hierarchical Structure of Evaluation Index System 
 
Indexes chosen for evaluation should be as comprehensive and complete as possible, so that the nature and 
determinant of bargaining power of migrant workers can be reflected from every aspect. In addition, indexes 
themselves should be theoretically systematic and practically manageable. Based on previous analysis, we build a 
hierarchical structure of evaluation index system here. 
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 Target Layer Criterion Layer Index Layer 
Figure 1:  Factors of the Hierarchical Structure 
 
Determining Factor Weight by AHP 
 
In the AHP, let B = (bij) be an n × n matrix of pair-wise comparisons, where bij > 0, bij = 1 / bji, for all 1 ≤ 
i, j ≤ n , thus B is called a judging matrix. In the constitution of the judging matrix, to get rid of the subjective 
factors, experts are asked to grade the importance between each index and each criterion in the index system. Then 
we can calculate the weights. A total of 25 respondents that include research experts on migrant workers, professors, 
employers, and migrant workers themselves were selected. These respondents conducted a pair-wise comparison 
between the enhancing factors and developed a judgment matrix to determine the relative importance of the various 
factors in the hierarchy. Moreover, these respondents evaluated the various factors, that is, the strength of each 
factor. Because space is limited, we omitted the tedious formula and procedure, and only present the resultant data in 
Tables 2-6. 
 
Table 2:  A-B Judgment Matrix, Weight, and Consistency Test 
A B1 B2 B3 Weight 入max 
B1 1 5 4 0.665 
3.073 B2 1/5 1 1/3 0.056 
B3 1/4 3 1 0.187 
Consistency Test CI/RI = 0.037/0.58 = 0.063 < 0.1 
 
Table 3:  B1-C1 Judgment Matrix, Weight, and Consistency Test 
B1 C11 C12 C13 C14 Weight 入max 
C11 1 5 3 3 0.518 
4.151 
C12 1/5 1 1/2 2 0.133 
C13 1/3 2 1 4 0.252 
C14 1/3 1/2 1/4 1 0.094 
Consistency Test CR = CI/RI = 0.05/0.96 = 0.052 < 0.1 
 
Factors 
enhancing 
migrant 
workers’ 
bargaining 
power 
A 
Environment B3 
Quality and Human Capital C11 
Information Superiority C14 
Group Influence C12 
Collective Bargaining C13 
Type of Enterprise C21 
Supply and DemandC31 
Industrial Concentration C32 
Unions C33 
Migrant Workers B1 
Enterprise B2 
Government and Policy C34 
Loss Cost C22 
Developing Stage C23 
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Table 4:  B2-C2 Judgment Matrix, Weight, and Consistency Test 
B2 C21 C22 C23 Weight 入max 
C21 1 4 5 0.680 
3.023 C22 1/4 1 2 0.201 
C23 1/5 1/2 1 0.117 
Consistency Test CR = CI/RI = 0.0115/0.58 = 0.020 < 0.1 
 
Table 5:  B3-C3 Judgment Matrix, Weight, and Consistency Test 
B3 C31 C32 C33 C34 Weight 入max 
C31 1 5 7 5 0.608 
4.166 C32 1/5 1 4 3 0.221 
C33 1/7 1/4 1 1/2 0.064 
C34 1/5 1/3 2 1 0.106  
Consistency Test CR = CI/RI = 0.055/0.96 = 0.058 < 0.1 
 
Table 6:  Fuzzy Evaluation Matrix 
Indicators 
Very Strong 
(No.) 
Strong 
(No.) 
Relatively 
Strong (No.) 
Medium 
(No.) 
Relatively 
Weak (No.) 
Weak 
(No.) 
Very Weak 
(No.) 
C11 0.32(8) 0.48(12) 0.08(2) 0.12(3) 0 0 0 
C12 0.12(3) 0.28(7) 0.4(10) 0.12(3) 0.08(2) 0 0 
C13 0.28(7) 0.4(10) 0.12(3) 0.16(4) 0.04(1) 0 0 
C14 0.08(2) 0.2(5) 0.32(8) 0.2(5) 0.12(3) 0.08(2) 0 
C21 0.32(8) 0.32(8) 0.08(2) 0.12(3) 0.08(2) 0 0.08(2) 
C22 0.16 (4) 0.12(3) 0.36(9) 0.2(5) 0.08(2) 0.08(2) 0 
C23 0 0.24(6) 0.12(3) 0.4 (10) 0.12(3) 0.08(2) 0.04(1) 
C31 0.32(8) 0.28(7) 0.12(3) 0.2(5) 0.08(2) 0 0 
C32 0.2(5) 0.28(7) 0.32(8) 0.16(4) 0.04(1) 0 0 
C33 0.12(3) 0.08(2) 0.2(5) 0.36(9) 0.16 (4) 0.08(2) 0.08(2) 
C34 0.08 (2) 0.12(3) 0.4 (10) 0.2(5) 0.12(3) 0.04(1) 0.08(2) 
 
Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation 
 
The fuzzy comprehensive evaluation Bij of the criterion layer is calculated by: 
 
Bi = Ai × Ri (1) 
 
where Ai is the weight of Bi and Ri is the fuzzy evaluation matrix of Bi; The fuzzy comprehensive evaluation of the 
target layer is set by: 
 
B = A × R (2) 
 
where A is the weight of B and R is the fuzzy evaluation matrix of Bi. Each comment in the reviews is given a 
standard score {95, 85, 75, 65, 55, 45, 35}, and then the fuzzy evaluation score of the enhancing factors of the 
bargaining power is obtained (Du, 2005). The final evaluation results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
Table 7:  Second-Level Indicators of First-Level Evaluation Vector 
Second-Level Indicators Weight bi1 bi2 bi3 bi4 bi5 bi6 bi7 
C11 0.518 
0.260 0.405 0.155 0.137 0.032 0.008 0.000 
C12 0.133 
C13 0.252 
C14 0.094 
C21 0.680 
0.250 0.270 0.153 0.169 0.085 0.025 0.059 C22 0.201 
C23 0.117 
C31 0.608 
0.254 0.250 0.199 0.201 0.080 0.009 0.014 
C32 0.221 
C33 0.064 
C34 0.106 
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Table 8:  Comprehensive Evaluation Vector 
First-Level Indicators Weight b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 
Migrant workers 0.665 
0.234 0.331 0.149 0.108 0.024 0.008 0.006 Enterprises 0.056 
Environment 0.187 
 
The evaluation set is changed to the rating scores vector, i.e., Z = {95, 85, 75, 65, 55, 45, 35}. The final 
score of all the factors can then be calculated by: 
 
H = B × ZT (3) 
 
where B is fuzzy comprehensive evaluation vector and ZT is the transportation of the rating scores vector Z. Score 
of migrant workers: H1 = B1 ×ZT = (0.260, 0.405, 0.155, 0.137, 0.032, 0.008, 0.000) × (95, 85, 75, 65, 55, 45, 35) T 
= 81.8 points. Score of enterprises: H2 = B2 × ZT = (0.250, 0.270, 0.153, 0.169, 0.085, 0.025, 0.059) × (95, 85, 75, 
65, 55, 45, 35) T = 77.03 points. Score of environment: H3 = B3 × ZT = (0.254, 0.250, 0.199, 0.201, 0.080, 0.009, 
0.014) × (95, 85, 75, 65, 55, 45, 35) T = 78.67 points. We can obtain the final score of the bargaining power of 
migrant workers, with H = B × ZT = (0.234, 0.331, 0.149, 0.108, 0.024, 0.008, 0.006) × (95, 85, 75, 65, 55, 45, 35) 
T = 70.45 points. The bargaining power of migrant workers is between medium (65 points) and strong (75 points) 
and is biased in favor of the medium. 
 
Based on the results of the factors enhancing the bargaining power of migrant workers, the migrant workers 
obtained the highest score of 81.8 points. This result indicates that the change in migrant workers is the direct factor 
or variable that enhances their bargaining power. The overall score of the bargaining power of migrant workers is 
approximately 70.45 points at the medium level. Therefore, their bargaining power needs improvement. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the results, the migrant workers themselves are the most important factor in promoting their 
bargaining power. The reason for this is the generational change in migrant workers and the change in their 
mentality. The main force of migrant workers is the so-called second-generation migrant workers, whose age range 
is from 17 to 30 years old. The qualifications and skills of the new generation of migrant workers have been 
improved to a certain extent with more job choices, but these workers are not interested in general work and manual 
jobs. A gap exists in the supply of ordinary labor in manufacturing and labor-intensive enterprises. The case in 
which supply is less than the demand increases the bargaining power of migrant workers, which is inevitable. 
Migrant workers pay more attention to long-term interests and “spillover” effects of work, which include the 
enhancement of the opportunity to learn technical skills and welfare conditions, the possibility of integration into the 
city after completing their education, and the possibility of having a comprehensive quality of life. The internal 
structural changes among migrant workers enable the changes in the employment structure of migrant workers, thus 
affecting the supply and demand in the labor market and becoming a cause for concern on the part of businesses, 
labor unions, and the government. From this perspective, the migrant workers are the fundamental factor that 
enhances their own bargaining power. 
 
The enhancement of the bargaining power of migrant workers benefits from their relatively high education, 
enhanced sense of collective bargaining, and increasing influence as a group. The improvement of the bargaining 
power, social status, rights, and interests of migrant workers can better protect labor rights and enhance the migrant 
workers upward potential, promoting their human capital. In this paper, the positive effect of the enhancement of the 
bargaining power of migrant workers is summarized as follows. First, migrant workers safeguard their rights and 
interests. The serious imbalance between supply and demand in the labor market in China has existed for a long 
time. The right of migrant workers to speak for their own interests has been in a weak position under the premise of 
the supply and demand imbalance (Qin, 2009). Employers take advantage of their dominant position in the labor 
market and drive down the wage of migrant workers. With the enhancement of the bargaining power of migrant 
workers, the situation that companies unilaterally decide the wage has been limited and migrant workers can now 
safeguard their own interests to a certain extent. Second, the enhancement of the bargaining power of migrant 
workers and their increasing job autonomy has caused the adjustment in the industrial structure. The natural turnover 
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of the labor market appears sharp: the new generation of migrant workers is becoming the main component of the 
labor market in China. The choices of work and concepts of choosing jobs of these new-generation workers are 
different from those of their parents. They understand that the primary assembly line work cannot meet their needs. 
The concept of “shortage of migrant workers” is a reflection of objective reality, positively stimulating the economic 
development of China and forcing coastal areas and the Mainland to accelerate the transformation and upgrading of 
Chinese industries. Third, the improvement of the bargaining power of migrant workers promotes labor unions and 
the regulations of collective bargaining for better implementation. In the 12th five-year planning framework of 
China, collective bargaining is regulated to promote collective wage negotiations and form a kind of wage 
determination and growth mechanism that reflects business benefits and the relationship between supply and 
demand in the market. Several regions and enterprises have formed the atmosphere of collective wage negotiations 
and labor unions at all levels. Workers consider the wage collective negotiations as the key work in coordinating 
labor relations and safeguarding their own rights and interests to promote wage collective negotiations. 
 
The open vision of the new generation of migrant workers provides them with more power in the 
bargaining game with enterprises. However, enhancing the bargaining power of the former is accompanied by 
several negative aspects. 
 
Firstly, the wage growth can be unhealthy for the economy if it is not managed and balanced effectively. 
According to statistics from 2001 to 2009, a mutation process was noted in the changes in the wages of migrant 
workers. From 2001 to 2005, the average annual growth rate of wages for migrant workers was only 4.8 percent, 
whereas in 2006 alone, the annual per capita wages of migrant workers increased to 12,240 yuan from 6,577 yuan in 
2005, a growth rate of 86.1 percent. Until 2009, the average annual wage growth rate remained at 12.97 percent 
(Zou, 2012). The substantial increase in wages for migrant workers in 2006 can be attributed to the emergence of the 
“shortage of migrant workers.” The fight for the wage increase of migrant workers merely relies on the withdrawal 
from the labor market. In a socialist country such as China, the situation is clearly unhealthy, causing stagnant 
production resulting from underemployment. This situation is slowing down urbanization in China, which is not 
conducive to the social and economic development of the country. 
 
Secondly, human capital accumulation is insufficient because of temporary employment of migrant 
workers. The “migrant workers’ employment trends report” released by Tsinghua University indicates that the 
temporary employment trend of migrant workers intensified these years, with the average work of migrant workers 
lasting 3.8 years in the early 2000s, while it was 1.4 years in 2008 (Fu, 2012). “Day laborers” are linked to the 
meticulous division of labor in the Taylor system, which does not enable migrant workers to improve their wages by 
developing their own skills through long-term work. Most migrant workers do not possess accumulated knowledge 
about technology and cannot increase wages by changing companies. On the contrary, frequent transfers from 
enterprise to enterprise make migrant workers unable to enjoy the benefits of social and medical insurance and other 
social security system benefits. 
 
Thirdly, the labor cost of small businesses increases. The phenomena of “labor shortage” and “strikes” have 
enhanced the bargaining power of migrant workers: employers can no longer hire workers as they wish and are 
required to raise wages and improve the welfare of migrant workers. In 2010, around 84 percent of the 450,000 
employees in Shenzhen Foxconn factory realized their demand for a salary adjustment. Thus, the monthly base 
salary of Shenzhen factory employees increased to 415.8 million yuan, which is approximately 60 billion a year 
(Ningbo Network, 2010). This figure would be disastrous for coastal processing enterprises that rely on low labor 
costs. Except for the auto parts production and assembly industries, no pay increase has been provided to processing 
enterprises employees. These enterprises belonging to the low-end chain have no power to bargain with international 
capital. 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Changes in the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers are influenced by different factors. In this 
study, we mainly predicted the changes that would take place based on the following factors: the supply and demand 
of Chinese migrant workers and the quality of Chinese migrant workers; the employment system, structural 
upgrading, and technological progress of Chinese enterprises; and the education system in China and the related 
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policies and regulations released by the Chinese government. This paper also analyzed the micro (i.e., Chinese 
migrant workers), meso (i.e., Chinese enterprises), and macro (i.e., the Chinese government and labor unions) levels 
to present a conclusion. 
 
First, 24 provinces in China are raising the minimum wage standard in 2013. This action safeguards the 
rights and interests of workers and reduces the wage gap to enable ordinary workers to enjoy the fruits of the 
economic reforms and opening. Related to the state of “shortage of migrant workers” or short supply of Chinese 
migrant workers, increasing the wages is the only way to attract them to work. In recent years, ordinary labor supply 
in China has been exhibiting a downward trend in terms of growth. In the 1990s, the annual labor increase in China 
was between 10 million and 20 million, whereas the growth rate of the past two years was only in a few millions 
(Xinhua Net, 2011). This phenomenon can be attributed to the birth control policy of China. Birth restrictions have 
led to a corresponding control in the rural population. However, among the consequences of such policy is the 
reduction of the number of the rural labor force. With the improvement of the education level of migrant workers in 
China, their employment structure has also changed, with the number of migrant workers in the low-end production 
dwindling. In the “seller’s market” caused by the “shortage of migrant workers,” the short supply of migrant 
workers continues to enhance their bargaining power. 
 
Second, from the perspective of Chinese enterprises, the main employment system in China is the labor 
contract system. The employment of enterprises is the full implementation of the labor contract system. With the 
help of labor unions, migrant workers can sign collective contracts with employers to protect their basic rights. The 
industrial structure of China is escalating the changes in labor-intensive industries because of technological 
advances. The presence of more machines instead of human labor seems to weaken the capacity of migrant workers 
to negotiate with enterprises. However, the role of migrant workers should not be overlooked, particularly in the 
services industry, which is in urgent need of such workers. In this case, the bargaining power of migrant workers 
still has room for improvement. 
 
Third, the current education system in China continues to undergo reforms, including the implementation 
of the nine-year compulsory education. The government strongly advocates popularizing the nine-year compulsory 
education so that rural children can enjoy free compulsory education and no longer have to drop out of school 
because of the inability to pay school fees. Therefore, the state supports poor rural and college students to complete 
their studies by granting loans. Such programs provide opportunities to rural children to obtain an education, which 
plays an important role in their bargaining power when they become workers. Moreover, local governments 
continue to increase the minimum wage standard to protect the rights and interests of laborers. These policies and 
regulations protect the legitimate rights and interests of migrant workers, providing a legal basis for migrant workers 
when they bargain with employers. 
 
Our analysis indicates that the change in the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers is influenced by 
factors such as education level and policy support. However, certain factors such as technological progress in 
enterprises weaken the bargaining power of migrant workers. In general, the economic development and 
optimization of industrial structure upgrading in China, as well as the improvement of the educational level and 
technical experience of Chinese migrant workers, can further improve the bargaining power of Chinese migrant 
workers. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Although the bargaining power of migrant workers has improved, this paper concludes that the bargaining 
power of migrant workers is only 70 points, which is at the medium level. Even in a “seller’s market” caused by the 
so-called “shortage of migrant workers,” the bargaining power of migrant workers remains low. If in a rare case of a 
“seller’s market,” the wage bargaining power of migrant workers, as well as their social status and rights, has not 
been fundamentally improved, then this situation places migrant workers at a disadvantage. We discussed in the 
previous sections of this paper that the positive role of the enhancement of the bargaining power of migrant workers 
is greater than the negative effect. We predicted that the bargaining power of migrant workers would further 
improve. Therefore, we should take the needed measures and suggestions to promote the further improvement of the 
bargaining power of migrant workers. However, the relationship between employees and employers is not only 
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concerned about the interests of migrant workers but also considers the reasonable interests of enterprises. 
Therefore, the government and labor unions should not stand by idly. The four sectors should cooperate and achieve 
a situation that will benefit all sectors concerned. 
 
Migrant Workers 
 
As for the factors that enhance the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers, the factor of the Chinese 
migrant workers themselves influences the enhancement of their bargaining power most. Therefore, the intrinsic 
value of Chinese migrant workers has a great influence on their bargaining power. Intrinsic value depends on the 
qualities of a person, such as those related to skills, knowledge, and experience. Chinese migrant workers must 
improve themselves to enhance their bargaining power through receiving education, getting skillful training, and 
achieving stabile work to enhance their own human capital. On one hand, knowledge and skills accumulation enable 
Chinese migrant workers to become mature workers even scarce workers which play a positive effect on enhancing 
their bargaining power in labor-intensive industries; on the other hand, high levels of education and skills also 
enable migrant workers to increase their competitiveness with other labor force in such industries where migrant 
workers’ bargaining power is relatively weak. In addition, Chinese migrant workers cannot achieve collective 
rationality because of the lack of the sense of collective cooperation. Chinese migrant workers should safeguard 
their own interests and rights through horizontal integration and conscious cooperation or strengthen the awareness 
of protecting their rights by law. 
 
Enterprises 
 
The bargaining power enhancement of Chinese migrant workers is the trend of the future development of 
enterprises. The process of employment is a transaction process between labor capital and physical capital. This 
process is accompanied by another process that the value of labor force is fully displayed and admitted; workers 
themselves realize the value of their human capital progressively. When the bargaining power between the 
enterprise and its employee’s changes, wise enterprise should re-adjust the relationship between interests and 
allocation, raise the wages, improve the working environment, and reinforce the incentives in accordance with the 
change in bargaining power. Enterprises should also keep an active attitude toward the enhancement of the 
bargaining power of employees instead of having a negative attitude to prevent the upgrading of the bargaining 
power of employees. However, the bargaining game involving employers and employees should achieve balance; 
any party with too strong a bargaining power will affect the rational development of the labor market. 
 
Labor Unions 
 
Labor unions act as the beneficial representative of workers, some scholars called them “collective 
speaking system” (Ronald & Robert, 1999), the intention of labor unions is to change the weak position of workers 
and use organizational strength to maintain workers’ rights, labor union is the precondition of collective bargaining. 
The western countries generally establish the collective bargaining system to handle labor conflicts and collective 
bargaining has become the main means of adjusting labor relations under the conditions of market economy. 
However, most of Chinese migrant workers lack of “beneficial spokesman”, leading not to compete with employers 
by collective strength. There are more than one million migrant workers in China that are out of reach the labor 
unions, the setting up rate of labor union is lower in non-public enterprises and the membership rate only reached 
32%, by the end of 2010. There were about five million workers signing wages special collective contract with the 
company in Guangdong province, while there were about 26 million staffs totally (Zhang & Wu, 2010). 
 
Government 
 
Generally speaking, a country's institutional factors produce great influence for their workers’ wage 
bargaining. In China, urban-rural dual system of the “hukou” registration system (rural registered permanent 
residence and urban registered permanent residence isolation) and the social security system (the social security of 
city residents is more perfect than the rural residents) play a great effect on Chinese migrant workers’ wage 
bargaining. The government should speed up the system reform, especially the urban-rural dual structure of the 
“hukou” system, which is the cause of differences in wage, education, housing, medical care, and other aspects 
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between the Chinese migrant workers and city residents, and it also indirectly affects the labor employment system, 
social security system and public service system. Therefore, to promote the Chinese migrant workers working in the 
city and improve the weak position of Chinese migrant workers, and to ultimately improve the bargaining power of 
Chinese migrant workers, the government should make great efforts to strip various welfare system behind the 
“hukou” system, establish a unified household registration system, unified urban-rural labor market system and 
unified social security system. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this paper, we refined the enhancing factors for the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers 
through a review of existing literature, analyzing the available data, and primary research by conducting interviews. 
Several other factors were not discussed in this paper, but we intend to expand the range and the number of 
enhancing factors in a follow-up study. Moreover, because of the different economic development between different 
regions and labor markets, the bargaining power of migrant workers in this region differs from that of migrant 
workers in other regions. This paper did not conduct a rigorous regional distinction. In future research, we will 
distinguish regional differences and carry out an inter-regional comparative study to further tap the value and 
significance of this kind of research. 
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